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The article examines the Partial Award of 30 June 2016 in the matter of an 
arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia, which presents particular interest with 
regard to the topic of termination of a treaty— which in this case was an arbitration 
agreement— on the grounds of its material breach by a party. It focuses on the issues 
of: i) the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to examine the legality of the purported 
termination of the arbitration agreement; ii) the possibility of termination of an 
arbitration agreement because of its material breach; iii) the definition of material 
breach, examining the notion of repudiation of a treaty and the notion of violation of 
a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty, 
as well as the question of whether the material character of the breach depends on 
the gravity of the latter; and iv) procedural issues with regard to the termination of a 
treaty on the grounds of its material breach. The article argues that the Tribunal 
made in this Partial Award some important clarifications with regard to the issue of 
termination of a treaty on the grounds of its material breach. Moreover, the Tribunal 
arguably emphasised treaty stability, by adopting a strict interpretation of the 
definition of material breach according to Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT, which, however, to a 
certain extent moves away from the letter of this provision. 
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The Partial Award of 30 June 20161 in the matter of an arbitration between Croatia 
and Slovenia (‘Award’) concerned the issue of the jurisdiction of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, which was based on an Arbitration Agreement between the parties. It 
provides interesting insights on the question of the fate of an arbitration in case of a 
purported termination by a party of the arbitration agreement on the grounds of its 
material breach by the other party and, more broadly, on the issue of termination of a 
treaty on the grounds of its material breach. This article will examine the above-
                                                 
1 In the Matter of an Arbitration Under the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, signed on 4 November 2009 
(Croatia/Slovenia) Partial Award of 30 June 2016, PCA, available at 
<https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1787>, accessed 18 February 2019. 
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mentioned Award focusing on the law of treaties. It does not purport to evaluate 
other aspects of the Award, particularly with regard to the procedural irregularities 
which had given rise to it and their effect on the arbitral proceedings.2  
 
1.1 Background of the Arbitration3 
 
The arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia concerned a territorial and maritime 
dispute between them. Both Croatia and Slovenia are successor states to the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Between 1992 and 2001, following their 
declarations of independence, the two states engaged in bilateral negotiations, as 
well as in a mediation process, in an attempt to determine the land and maritime 
boundaries between them. Nevertheless, such attempts were fruitless. On 1 May 
2004 Slovenia acceded to the European Union, but when Croatia tried to accede to 
the European Union, Slovenia raised reservations to several of the negotiating 
chapters at the Intergovernmental Accession Conference of the European Union with 
Croatia in December 2008, on the grounds that these might prejudice the 
determination of the boundaries between the two states.  
Eventually, on the basis of an initiative of the European Commissioner for 
Enlargement, the dispute between the two states was submitted to arbitration by the 
Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the Republic of Slovenia, signed by the parties on 4 November 2009 
in Stockholm (‘Arbitration Agreement’ or ‘Agreement’).4 Following the entry into 
force of the Agreement on 29 November 2010, and in accordance with its provisions, 
Slovenia lifted its reservations to Croatia’s accession to the European Union, which 
took place on 1 July 2013. 
In the meantime, the constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal took place in 2012 and 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration acted as Registry in the arbitration. On 22 July 
2015, a few months before the award would have been rendered, Serbian and 
Croatian newspapers published intercepted telephone conversations between Dr 
Sekolec, the arbitrator appointed by Slovenia, and Ms Simona Drenik, one of two 
agents designated by Slovenia. In these conversations, Dr Sekolec reportedly 
disclosed confidential information about the Tribunal’s deliberations to Ms Drenik. 
Following these reports, Dr Sekolec and Ms Drenik resigned from their functions in 
the proceedings. 
This incident gave rise to a disagreement between the parties with regard to the 
continuation of the arbitration. Eventually, on 30 July 2015, Croatia notified 
Slovenia by note verbale that, in view of the aforementioned incident, it considered 
                                                 
2 For a concise general overview of the Award see Emanuel Castellarin, ‘La Sentence Partielle du 
30 Juin 2016 dans l’ affaire du différend territorial et maritime entre la Croatie et la Slovénie’ (2016) 
LXII Annuaire Français de Droit International 129. 
3 See analytically Award [5]-[86].   
4 Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government 
of the Republic of Slovenia (adopted 4 November 2009, entered into force 29 November 2010) 
(Annex HRLA-75/Annex SI-395), available at <https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2165>, 
accessed 18 February 2019.  
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that Slovenia had materially breached the Arbitration Agreement, entitling Croatia to 
terminate it in accordance with Art 60 (1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties5 (‘VCLT’) and that from the date of that note the Republic of 
Croatia ceased to apply the Arbitration Agreement.6 On its part, on 13 August 2015, 
Slovenia informed the Tribunal of its objection to Croatia’s notification of its 
intention to terminate the Arbitration Agreement7 and stated that the Tribunal had 
the power and the duty to continue the proceedings.8  
Following its reconstitution, in letter dated 1 December 2015 the Tribunal 
provided for further written and oral submissions of the parties ‘concerning the legal 
implications of the matters set out in Croatia’s letters of 24 July 2015 and 31 July 
2015’. Slovenia participated in these proceedings and in its Written Submission filed 
on 26 February 2016 it requested the Tribunal to decide that: 1) The Arbitration 
Agreement remained in force between the parties; and 2) The proceedings pursuant 
to the Arbitration Agreement would continue until the Tribunal issued a final 
Award.9  
By contrast, Croatia did not participate in the proceedings and stated ‘that— to 
assure the sound administration of justice, and for legal and ethical reasons— the 
Arbitral Tribunal should terminate its work with immediate effect.’10 According to 
it, the solution to the border dispute had to be found outside the framework of the 
arbitration ‘in accordance with international law and in the spirit of good 
neighbourly relations.’11 
 
1.2 The Award 
 
The Tribunal continued the proceedings despite the absence of Croatia, having 
recalled the principle of international procedural law (also incorporated in Art 28 of 
the PCA Optional Rules)12 that a unilateral decision of a party to withdraw from 
dispute settlement proceedings cannot bring such proceedings to an end.13 It dealt 
                                                 
5 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 
1980) 115 UNTS 331. 
6 Note verbale from the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 3303/2015 (30 July 2015) (Annex SI-
1034). 
7 Letter from the Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia to the Prime Minister of Croatia, No. 
570-3/2015/4 (31 July 2015) (Annex SI-1041). 
8 PCA press release, ‘Slovenia demands continuation of arbitration proceedings— Arbitral 
Tribunal clarifies further procedural steps’, 19 August 2015 
<https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1403>, accessed 18 February 2019. 
9 Written Submission of the Republic of Slovenia (‘Written Submission’) filed on 26 February 
2016, 56. 
10 Note verbale from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations to the 
Permanent Missions and Permanent Observer Missions, No. 55/2016, 3 (16 March 2016) (Annex SI-
1058). 
11 Ibid, 4; Letter from the Croatian Prime Minister to the Slovenian Prime Minister (31 July 2015). 
12 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between two States, 
available at <https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/01/Optional-Rules-for-
Arbitrating-Disputes-between-Two-States_1992.pdf>, accessed 18 February 2019. 
13 Award [142]. 
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with three main issues: 1) its jurisdiction to examine the legality of the purported 
termination of the Arbitration Agreement; 2) its duty and ability to continue the 
proceedings; and 3) the legality of the termination of the Arbitration Agreement.  
Eventually, the Tribunal decided that: 1) It had jurisdiction to examine the legality 
of the purported termination of the Arbitration Agreement;14 2) there was no obstacle 
to the continuation of the arbitral proceedings in view of the recomposition of the 
Tribunal and the remedial action taken by it;15 and 3) although Slovenia had violated 
provisions of the Arbitration Agreement, the latter remained in force; thus, the 
arbitral proceedings pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement had to continue.16 
In this article, from the above mentioned three issues examined by the Tribunal, 
the first and the third will be critically analysed, since the second is not connected 
with the material breach of the Arbitration Agreement. The Tribunal decided to 
separate the issue of the termination of the Arbitration Agreement from the issue of 
the termination of the arbitral proceedings; as it has been correctly observed, 
‘whereas the former entails the latter, the latter does not prompt the former.’17  
 
 
2 Jurisdiction of the Tribunal to Examine the Legality of the Purported 
Termination of the Arbitration Agreement 
 
The first question which arises in a case of purported termination of an arbitration 
agreement is whether the arbitral tribunal, the jurisdiction of which to decide on the 
subject matter of the arbitration is based on this agreement, is competent to examine 
the legality of such a termination. 
The Tribunal applied the well-established general international law rule according 
to which ‘an international tribunal has the right to decide as to its own jurisdiction 
and has the power to interpret for this purpose the instruments which govern that 
jurisdiction’18 (‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’, ‘la compétence de la compétence’), citing a 
number of relevant international instruments, decisions and awards.19 In particular, 
the Arbitration Agreement provided in its Art 6 (2) that, unless envisaged otherwise, 
the Arbitral Tribunal would conduct the proceedings according to the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States 
and Art 21 (1) of Section III of those Rules stipulates that ‘the arbitral tribunal shall 
have the power to rule on objections that it has no jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration clause or of the 
separate arbitration agreement.’20 Consequently, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to 
                                                 
14 Award [167]. 
15 Ibid [169]-[196]. See also above section 1.2. 
16 Award [231]. 
17 Arman Sarvarian, ‘Arbitration between Croatia and Slovenia: Leaks, Wiretaps, Scandal (Part 4)’ 
(EJIL: Talk!, 3 May 2016), available at <https://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-between-croatia-and-
slovenia-leaks-wiretaps-scandal-part-4/>, accessed 18 February 2019.  
18 Nottebohm Case (Preliminary Objections) [1953] ICJ Rep 111, 119.  
19 Award [148]-[156].  
20 See n 12 (emphasis added). 
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determine whether the Arbitration Agreement still existed, namely whether it 
remained in force or whether it had been terminated.21 
The Tribunal made clear that the purported termination of the Arbitration 
Agreement by Croatia on the grounds of its alleged material breach by Slovenia did 
not deprive it of that jurisdiction22 and it referred in this regard to the ICJ judgment 
in the ICAO Council case. In this judgment the Court stated that the purported 
unilateral termination or suspension of a treaty does not affect jurisdictional clauses, 
as the contrary solution would enable a party purporting to terminate or suspend a 
treaty to avoid the determination of the legality of its act by a dispute settlement 
organ.23 
It must be noted that Croatia had not clearly argued that the Tribunal lacked 
jurisdiction by reason of its purported termination of the Agreement, namely that the 
purported termination of the Agreement terminated the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.24 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal considered it pertinent to clarify the issue. Having thus 
already determined that it had jurisdiction to examine the legality of the purported 
termination of the Arbitration Agreement and that this jurisdiction is not affected by 
the purported termination of the Agreement by Croatia, the Tribunal rejected 
Croatia’s claim that the procedure to be followed was that of Arts 65 and 66 VCLT 
with respect to the termination of a treaty25 and clarified that its jurisdiction is 
instead preserved by Art 65 (4) VCLT,26 according to which ‘nothing in the 
foregoing paragraphs [paragraphs 1-3] shall affect the rights or obligations of the 
parties under any provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement 
of disputes.’ 
 
3 The Possibility of Termination of the Arbitration Agreement on the 
Grounds of Material Breach 
 
The Tribunal decided that, with the exception of the question of the legality of the 
purported termination of the Arbitration Agreement by Croatia, there was no 
obstacle to the continuation of the arbitral proceedings in view of the recomposition 
of the Tribunal and the remedial action taken by it.27 Therefore, it went on to 
examine this question.  
                                                 
21 Award [160],[162].  
22 Ibid [161]. 
23 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) [1972] ICJ Rep 46 
(‘ICAO Council case’) [16]. See also [32] of the same judgment.  
24Letter from the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia to the 
Registrar of the Tribunal (31 July 2015) (Annex SI-1040). 
25 According to Croatia, given the objection of Slovenia to the notification of termination of the 
Agreement by the former, the procedure to be followed was determined by Art 65 (3) VCLT, 
according to which the parties had to ‘seek a solution through the means indicated in article 33 of the 
Charter of the United Nations’ (ibid).   
26 Award [163]-[168].  
27 Ibid [169]-[196]. See also above section 1.2. 
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It noted that both Croatia and Slovenia are parties to the VCLT28 and made clear 
that Art 60 (1) VCLT, which stipulates that ‘a material breach of a bilateral treaty by 
one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating 
the treaty … in whole or in part’, applies to arbitration agreements. Art 60 VCLT is 
drafted in general terms and therefore applies to any treaty provisions not covered by 
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same article.29 Indeed, nothing seems to preclude the 
possibility of the termination of a treaty providing for compulsory dispute settlement 
in case of material breach of its provisions.  
The Tribunal observed that the Arbitration Agreement did not contain provisions 
with regard to the action which could be taken by one party in case of breach of the 
Arbitration Agreement by the other party. In other words, there were no rules in the 
Arbitration Agreement which could be considered as lex specialis to Art 60 VCLT in 
the sense of Art 60 (4) VCLT (which stipulates that paragraphs 1-3 of Art 60 ‘are 
without prejudice to any provision in the treaty applicable in the event of a breach’) 
and, therefore, contrary to the submission by Slovenia,30 Art 60 (4) VCLT did not 
prevent the application of Art 60 (1).31  
Thus, the central question was whether the breaches committed were material so 
that Art 60 (1) VCLT could apply. 
 
4 The Definition of Material Breach 
 
The Tribunal noted that a ‘material breach’ as required by Art 60 (1) VCLT could 
consist according to Art 60 (3) VCLT either in a repudiation of the treaty (Art 60 
(3)(a) VCLT) or in the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of 
the object and purpose of the treaty (Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT).32 It went on to examine 




First, the Tribunal had to examine the existence of a repudiation of the Arbitration 
Agreement. Croatia stated in a note verbale, which was issued on the eve of the 
hearing before the Tribunal, that Slovenia’s conduct amounted to a repudiation of the 
Arbitration Agreement, without elaborating on this argument.33 The Tribunal treated 
this note verbale as constituting a distinct ground on which Croatia based its 
purported termination of the Arbitration Agreement.34 Slovenia on its part claimed 
that even if it were accepted by the Tribunal that Slovenia’s conduct constituted a 
                                                 
28 Award [202]. 
29 Ibid [204]. These paragraphs refer to special provisions in the treaty applicable in the event of a 
breach (Art 60 (4)) and to provisions relating to the protection of the human person contained in 
treaties of a humanitarian character (Art 60 (5)). 
30 Written Submission [5.05]-[5.06].  
31 Ibid [206]. 
32 Award [212]. 
33 Note verbale (n 10), 3.   
34 Award [100]. 
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repudiation of the Arbitration Agreement, in the sense of Art 60 (3)(a) VCLT, it 
would still be possible for the Tribunal to achieve the object and purpose of the 
Agreement and, therefore, that the conduct complained of would not be so 
fundamental as to amount to a repudiation of the Agreement by Slovenia.35 
Both positions evidenced some misunderstanding with regard to the two versions 
of the definition of material breach according to Art 60 (3) VCLT. The two forms 
that the material breach can take according to this provision are included 
alternatively (‘or’), which means that, contrary to what Croatia seems to have 
argued, Slovenia’s conduct could not constitute at the same time repudiation and a 
violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of 
the treaty. Croatia did not clearly advance its argument with regard to repudiation as 
an alternative to its argument based on Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT. At the same time, 
Slovenia attempted to refute the argument based on repudiation by arguing that, in 
spite of the breach, the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the Arbitration 
Agreement was still possible; namely, it confused the two definitions of the notion of 
material breach by essentially arguing that since there was no material breach in the 
sense of Art 60 (3)(b) there was also no material breach in the sense of a repudiation 
of the Agreement according to Art 60 (3)(a) VCLT. 
The Tribunal offered some important clarifications of the notion of repudiation, 
thus supplementing the ILC commentary to Art 60 VCLT, which merely requires 
that the repudiation is ‘unjustified’, i.e. it is not sanctioned by any of the provisions 
of the VCLT.36 More specifically, the Tribunal noted that repudiation of an 
agreement means a ‘refusal to fulfil or discharge it’, involving ‘the rejection of a 
treaty as a whole by the defaulting party’37 and indeed ‘clearly and definitively’.38 It 
went on to explain: 
Against this yardstick, it cannot be said that Slovenia refused to apply the 
Arbitration Agreement or rejected that treaty as a whole. Quite to the contrary, 
Slovenia has argued that the Agreement continues to apply and has invited the 
Tribunal to assume its jurisdiction pursuant to the Agreement … A repudiation of 
the Agreement as a whole must be distinguished from a purported breach of any 
of its provisions, which may constitute a material breach under Article 60, 
paragraph 3, subparagraph (b) of the Vienna Convention.39 
The explanation of the notion of repudiation by the Tribunal, referring to refusal to 
apply the treaty or rejection of the treaty ‘as a whole’, is in accordance with the letter 
of Art 60 (3)(a) VCLT, which refers to repudiation of the treaty. If the drafters of the 
VCLT wanted to also include the possibility of partial repudiation of a treaty, they 
could have added the expression ‘in whole or in part’, which can be found in other 
                                                 
35 Transcript of the Oral Hearing of 17 March 2016, 56:10-21 (Statement by Sir Michael Wood). 
36 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 18th session’ (4 May-19 
July 1966), Supplement No 9, UN Doc A/CN.4/191, 255 [9].  
37 Award [213] (emphasis added), referring also to Mark Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Brill 2009) 742 [14]. 
38 Award [213].  
39 Ibid [214] (emphasis added). 
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provisions of Art 60. With regard to the Tribunal’s remark that the repudiation must 
be clear, it is suggested that it should be understood as encompassing not only the 
case in which the repudiation is done expressly, but also the case in which 
repudiation is inferred by the conduct of the state.40 In any case, the remark by the 
Tribunal that the repudiation must also be ‘definitive’ offers an additional element.  
It is notable that this award is the first time that a clear distinction between the two 
versions of the definition of material breach is made by an international dispute 
settlement organ; the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Legal consequences for 
States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia and its judgment in the 
Appeal relating to the jurisdiction of the ICAO Council case did not do so. In the 
Namibia case, the Court had noted that the General Assembly, in its Resolution 2145 
(XXI), had determined that South Africa had both repudiated (‘disavowed’) the 
Mandate and had committed a ‘deliberate and persistent’ violation which destroyed 
the object and purpose of the Mandate.41 Similarly, in the ICAO Council judgment 
the Court considered that even if India had repudiated the relevant Treaties, it would 
still be necessary to examine their provisions as a whole, and in particular those 
relating to the ‘safety of air travel’, in order to see whether Pakistan’s conduct 
amounted to such repudiation;42 namely, it also referred to the object and purpose of 
those Treaties, without making a distinction between Art 60 (3)(a) and (3)(b) VCLT. 
 
4.2 Violation of a Provision Essential to the Accomplishment of the 
Object or Purpose of the Treaty 
 
Having rejected the ground based on the repudiation of the Arbitration Agreement, 
the Tribunal had to examine the second version of the definition of material breach. 
The sequence of examination by the Tribunal evidences that if a repudiation (the 
most obvious form of material breach)43 is accepted, there is no need to examine the 
definition of material breach according to Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT. 
 
4.2.1 The Object and Purpose of the Treaty 
 
An important component of the definition of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT is ‘the object or 
purpose of the treaty’, the identification of which often presents serious difficulties. 
First of all, an interesting point in this regard is the following: the Tribunal in the 
Award referred to the ‘object and purpose’ of the Agreement, while the letter of Art 
60 (3)(b) VCLT refers to the ‘object or purpose’ of the treaty. However, it cannot be 
                                                 
40 See in this regard Special Rapporteur Fitzmaurice, Second report on the Law of Treaties, ILCYB 
1957-II, 36 Draft Art 30 (2); ibid, 69 [216], according to whom repudiation is ‘an act of outright 
rejection, whereby a party to a treaty declares or evidences an intention no longer to be bound by it 
…’ (emphasis added). 
41 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ 
Rep 16 (‘Namibia case’) [95]. 
42 ICAO Council case (n 23) [38]. 
43 Special Rapporteur Waldock, Second report on the Law of Treaties, ILCYB 1963-II, 76 [13]. 
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inferred from the ILC works or the Vienna Conferences that the use of the 
expression ‘object or purpose’ in Art 60 (3)(b) was intended to reveal a difference 
from the other provisions of the VCLT, in which there is reference to the ‘object and 
purpose’ of the treaty.44 Thus, it seems to be accepted that no distinction should be 
made between a treaty’s object on the one hand and purpose on the other,45 
otherwise the concept is undermined. Presumably for this reason the Tribunal 
consistently uses the expression ‘object and purpose’. 
Thus, the Tribunal had to examine the object and purpose of the treaty. It referred 
in this regard to the application of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT in the ICJ judgments in the 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in 
Namibia46 and to the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
case47 in which the ICJ had examined this criterion for the material character of the 
breach. It examined the preamble of the Arbitration Agreement between Croatia and 
Slovenia and concluded that the object and purpose of the Arbitration Agreement 
was ‘the peaceful and definitive settlement of a dispute that had theretofore been 
incapable of amicable resolution.’48  
Indeed, the preamble of a treaty is a starting point for the identification of the 
object and purpose of a treaty;49 however, it is not the only one. According to the 
Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties adopted by the ILC, ‘[t]he object and 
purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith, taking account of the terms of 
the treaty in their context, in particular the title and the preamble of the treaty. 
Recourse may also be made to the preparatory works of the treaty and the 
circumstances of its conclusion and, where appropriate, the subsequent practice of 
the parties.’50 This becomes obvious later in the Award, where the Tribunal 
identifies a second object and purpose of the Arbitration Agreement, based on two 
                                                 
44 See analytically Jan Klabbers, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties’ 
(1997) VIII The Finnish Yearbook of International Law 138, 145-8. Reuter, during the works of the 
ILC, supported a distinction between the two notions (ILC, Summary Record of the 726th meeting, 
ILCYB 1964-I [77]) and expressed the view that Art 60 (3)(b) used the expression ‘object or purpose’ 
in order not to restrict the notion of material breach (Paul Reuter, ‘Solidarité et divisibilité des 
engagements conventionnels’ in Yoram Dinstein (ed), International Law at a Time of Perplexity: 
Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne (1989) 623, 628 note 9). See in the same vein Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge ad hoc Roucounas, Application of the Interim Accord of 13 September 1995 
(FYROM v Greece) [2011] ICJ Rep 644 [67]. Nevertheless, Reuter did not consider that there is 
complete separation between the two notions (Reuter, ibid, 628). 
45 See also Jan Klabbers, ‘Treaties, Object and Purpose’, MPEPIL online [8], last updated 
December 2006, accessed 18 February 2019; Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn OUP 
2015) 212-5.  
46 Namibia case (n 41) [95]. 
47 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (‘Nicaragua case’) [270]-[276].  
48 Award [219]. In this regard, it referred also to Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v 
Senegal) [1991] ICJ Rep 53 [49].  
49 Gardiner (n 45) 213, 217, who, however, warns that ‘preambles are not always drafted with care 
and a preamble itself may need interpreting’ (ibid).  
50 ILC, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, adopted by the ILC at its sixty-third session 
and submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission’s report covering the work on that 
session (A/66/10/Add.1) ILCYB 2011-II [3.1.5.1]. See also Arts 31-3 VCLT.   
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substantive provisions of the Agreement and on the circumstances of its 
conclusion.51 
At this point some further remarks on the object and purpose of a treaty are 
necessary. The reason why the expression ‘object or purpose of the treaty’ is in 
singular seems to be that the drafters of the VCLT considered that one ‘object or 
purpose’ needs to be identified.52 Although the ILC initially defined material breach 
as ‘the violation of a provision which is essential to the effective execution of any of 
the objects or purposes of the treaty’,53 implying that there could be more than one 
object and purpose in a treaty, it subsequently chose the formulation which was 
included in Art 60 (3)(b).54 Nevertheless, the task of identifying a single object and 
purpose of a treaty will in some cases present great difficulty, since the treaty may be 
considered as pursuing various objects and purposes.55  
In fact, the Tribunal considered that the Arbitration Agreement was an example of 
a treaty encompassing more than one object and purpose. It pointed out that the 
definitive settlement of the dispute regarding the land and maritime boundary 
between the two states was not the only object and purpose of the Arbitration 
Agreement, but that the Agreement also had as an object and purpose the lifting of 
the reservations of Slovenia to the accession of Croatia to the European Union and 
that from various elements of the Agreement56 ‘a nexus was established between the 
settlement of the territorial and maritime dispute and the accession of Croatia to the 
European Union.’57 Therefore, since Croatia had already become member of the 
European Union, the Tribunal noted that if Croatia could unilaterally terminate the 
Agreement only one of the ‘objects and purposes’ of the Arbitration Agreement 
would be achieved.58  
This remark was made by the Tribunal in response to the relevant argument put 
forward by Slovenia that Croatia’s position frustrated ‘the essential quid pro quo’ of 
the Agreement. In this regard, Slovenia referred to the judgments of the ICJ in the 
Fisheries Jurisdiction and the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project cases to argue that 
Croatia could not be released from its commitments under the Arbitration Agreement 
after it had already irrevocably benefited from the latter.59 Nevertheless, this remark 
                                                 
51 Award [220]. See below in this section.  
52 See Klabbers (n 45) [6]-[7].  
53 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 15th session’ (6 May-12 
July 1963) UN Doc A/CN.4/163, 204, Draft Art 42 (3)(b) (emphasis added). 
54 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 18th session’ (4 May-19 
July 1966), Supplement No 9, UN Doc A/CN.4/191, 253, Draft Art 57 (3)(b). 
55 See WTO, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products- Report of 
the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R [17]; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 1984), 130; DW Greig, ‘Reciprocity, 
Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties’ (1994) 34 Virginia Journal of International Law 295, 351-2. 
Such examples constitute the Charter of the United Nations (1 UNTS xvi), the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention (1833 UNTS 3) or the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (OJEU C 115). 
56 The Tribunal specifically referred to Arts 9 and 11 (3) of the Arbitration Agreement. 
57 Award [220]. 
58 Ibid [221].  
59 Written Submission [2.06], [2.10]-[2.11], [4.15]-[4.17], referring to Fisheries Jurisdiction 
(United Kingdom v Iceland) (Jurisdiction of the Court) [1973] ICJ Rep 3 [34]. Cf Transcript of the 
Oral Hearing of 17 March 2016, 7:21-8:2 (Statement by Mr Karl Erjavec), 41:13-24 (Statement by Sir 
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was in fact made as an obiter dictum, since, as it will be seen, the Tribunal took the 
view that there had not been material breach of the Arbitration Agreement by 
Slovenia and, therefore, Croatia was not entitled to terminate the Agreement.60 The 
Tribunal, presumably because it was not necessary in order to decide the case before 
it, did not clearly answer the question whether a party is entitled to terminate a treaty 
on the grounds of its material breach by the other party, when the former has already 
irrevocably benefited from the treaty. However, it seems to have implied that this 
question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, it is arguable that, as McNair 
has noted in this regard, where under a treaty certain obligations have been executed 
while certain others remain executory, a purported termination by the party which 
has received the benefit of the executed obligations on the grounds of a violation by 
the other party of an executory obligation will be difficult to justify.61 
Consequently, the Tribunal focused on whether there had been a violation of the 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the one of the two identified objects 
and purposes of the Agreement, namely the settlement of the dispute between the 
parties.62 
4.2.2 ‘…Essential to the Accomplishment…’ 
 
The Tribunal found that Ms Drenik, in her capacity as agent of Slovenia, had acted 
in breach ‘of various provisions governing the arbitration’.63 It must be noted that the 
Tribunal did not clearly determine the provisions of the Agreement which had been 
breached specifically by the agent of Slovenia.64 It had already found that Dr 
Sekolec and Ms Drenik had acted in breach of, inter alia, Art 6 (2) of the Arbitration 
Agreement,65 according to which ‘[u]nless envisaged otherwise, the Arbitral 
Tribunal shall conduct the proceedings according to the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States’, which 
pose a high standard of ‘impartiality or independence’ to all arbitrators.66  
In any case, the Tribunal decided that in view of the remedial action taken, 
particularly the resignations of Dr Sekolec and Ms Drenik from their functions in the 
proceedings and the recomposition of the Tribunal, the breach of the Arbitration 
                                                                                                                                          
Michael Wood), 76:8-77:6 (Statement by Mr Rodman Bundy) (also referring to Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) [1997] ICJ Rep 7 (‘Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case’), 
[114]). Nevertheless, in the latter case the Court referred to the non-implementation of the 1977 
Treaty by both parties. 
60 Award [225]. 
61 Arnold McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1961) 571. Castellarin (n 2) 137, 
considers this obiter dictum of the Tribunal as suggesting an application of the principle of 
proportionality: ‘l’ extinction de la convention d’ arbitrage est un moyen disproportionné par rapport 
à l’ atteinte à l’ objet et au but de la convention.’  
62 Award [222]. 
63 Ibid [208].  
64 Similarly Castellarin (n 2), 136. 
65 Award [175]. The text of the Award mistakenly cites Art 6 (1) of the Agreement. The Tribunal 
did not clearly state that Ms Drenik had acted in breach of Art 6 (2) of the Arbitration Agreement. For 
a criticism of the Award with regard to the identification of the breached provisions of the Agreement 
by the Tribunal see Castellarin (n 2), 135. 
66 Award [175]. 
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Agreement by Slovenia did ‘not render the continuation of the proceedings 
impossible’ and, therefore, did not defeat the object and purpose of the Agreement,67 
namely the settlement of the ‘dispute between the Parties in accordance with the 
applicable rules.’68 Thus, the Tribunal concluded that Croatia was not entitled to 
terminate the Agreement under Art 60 (1) VCLT and the Agreement remained in 
force.69  
It is noteworthy that the Tribunal moves away from the formulation of Art 60 
(3)(b) VCLT since instead of determining whether the breached provisions of the 
Agreement were essential for the accomplishment of its object and purpose, it 
requires that the breach defeats the object and purpose of the Agreement.70 More 
specifically, with regard to the latter criterion, it seems that the Tribunal adopted a 
strict interpretation of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT, focused on the impossibility of 
accomplishment of the object and purpose of the Agreement, essentially arguing that 
if the breach of the treaty can be remedied and such remedial action is taken — 
thereby permitting the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty—then 
the breach is not material. Ιt has been argued, however, that Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT 
does not require that the breach of the provision makes the realisation of the object 
and purpose of the treaty impossible, but that the realisation of the object and 
purpose is at least seriously threatened.71 In any case, the letter of Art 60 (3)(b) 
VCLT requires the element of the violation of a provision essential to the 
accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty; it does not seem to require 
impossibility of the accomplishment of this object and purpose. It might be argued 
that the breach of Art 6 (2) of the Arbitration Agreement was indeed a breach of a 
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the 
Agreement (if it is accepted that the object and purpose of the Agreement was the 
settlement of the ‘dispute between the Parties in accordance with the applicable 
rules’), even if the accomplishment of this object and purpose did not become 
impossible as a result of the breach in view of the remedial action taken.  
Of course, it is true that the Tribunal’s interpretation of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT offers 
more guarantees for treaty stability, as it poses a higher standard for meeting the 
                                                 
67 Ibid [224]-[225] (emphasis added). It referred in this regard to the Namibia case (n 41 [95]) and 
to the Nicaragua case (n 47 [270]-[276]) 
68 Award [222] (emphasis added). 
69 Ibid. Castellarin also interestingly notes (n 2, 137) that the Tribunal seems to have implied that 
the purported termination of the Agreement by Croatia was in contradiction with the request of the 
latter to the Tribunal right after the intercepted conversations were reported ‘to review the totality of 
the materials presented, and reflect on the grave damage that has been done to the integrity of the 
entire proceedings…’ (Award [223]-[224]). A similar argument had been advanced by Slovenia (ibid, 
[116]). However, the Tribunal did not clarify whether the conduct of Croatia would fall within the 
notion of estoppel or would be against good faith (Castellarin, ibid). In any case, it is doubtful that 
Croatia’s conduct would fall within Art 45 (b) VCLT, namely that Croatia could have lost the right to 
invoke the alleged material breach as a ground for terminating the Agreement, as it must by reason of 
its conduct have been considered as having acquiesced in the maintenance in force of the Agreement: 
it would be difficult to argue that the above-mentioned request amounts to acquiescence, given also 
the fact that Croatia made the notification required by Art 65 (1) VCLT quite promptly. The 
application of Art 45 VCLT should be made with great caution.   
70 See also Castellarin (n 2) 136. 
71 Paul Reuter, Introduction au droit des traités (3ème edn, Geneva 1995), 173.  
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condition of material breach for the termination of a treaty according to Art 60 
VCLT. Nevertheless, attention should be paid so that such an interpretation does not 
become too restrictive for the non-defaulting party or parties to a treaty. Although it 
could be accepted that a treaty should not be terminated in case of breach of one or 
more of its provisions which are essential for the accomplishment of its object and 
purpose if the breach can be remedied and the object and purpose of the treaty can 
still be achieved, such remedial action must not upset the balance of interests of the 
parties to the treaty in the performance of the obligations arising therefrom. It should 
be taken into account that the material breach of the Arbitration Agreement could 
arguably be remedied without considerable difficulty and without prejudicing the 
position of Croatia with regard to its interests in the performance of the Agreement; 
this might not be possible in case of material breach of other treaties. 
 
4.2.3 The Gravity of the Breach 
 
Croatia had argued that, as a result of Slovenia’s actions, essential procedural rules 
had been ‘systematically and gravely violated’.72 By contrast Slovenia disputed the 
gravity of the breach and it argued also on this basis against the application of Art 60 
(1) VCLT. It claimed that in case law as well as in the majority of the doctrine it is 
accepted that Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT applies only in case of ‘a gross infringement of an 
essential provision’, otherwise the termination of a treaty would be a 
‘disproportionate remedy’.73 However, in analysing Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT, the 
Tribunal noted that it ‘does not refer to the intensity or the gravity of the breach, but 
instead requires that the provision breached be essential for the accomplishment of 
the treaty’s object and purpose.’74 Thus the Tribunal made clear that the gravity of 
the breach is not an element of the definition of material breach according to the 
letter of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT. 
At this point the following remarks might be made. The definition of Art 60 (3)(b) 
VCLT is premised on the character of the breached provision, namely that it must 
have been essential for the accomplishment of the treaty’s object and purpose, and 
does not take into account the gravity of the breach. Therefore, according to the letter 
of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT, even a minor breach of an essential provision constitutes a 
material breach.75 Nevertheless, in the doctrine the view has been supported—which 
is shared also by the author of this article— that the element of gravity of the breach 
                                                 
72 Letter from the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia to the 
Registrar of the Tribunal, 2 (24 July 2015) (Annex SI-1021) (emphasis added). 
73 Transcript of the Oral Hearing of 17 March 2016, 45:17-48:15 (Statement by Sir Michael Wood) 
(emphasis added), referring to Bruno Simma, ‘Reflections on Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties and Its Background in General International Law’ (1970) 20 ÖZöR 5, 31. 
However, Slovenia connected this argument to its claim that the breaches of the Arbitration 
Agreement were not material since they could ‘be remedied’; namely, that the breaches did not ‘make 
the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty impossible’ (see above section 4.2.2).  
74 Award [215]. 
75 Cf however Waldock (n 43), 76 [13], as well as the amendments which were proposed by the 
Finnish (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.309) and US (UN Doc A/CONF.39/C.1/L.325) delegations in 
the Vienna Conference.  
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should be part of the definition of material breach according to Art 60 (3)(b) 
VCLT.76 There is some support for this view in international case law77 and in state 
practice;78 moreover, such an interpretation is more consistent with the purpose of 
VCLT in general, which is to ensure the stability of treaty relations according to the 
principle pacta sunt servanda. This purpose is achieved if states can release 
themselves of their treaty obligations only in case of a serious breach of the treaty.  
The Tribunal did not take a position on whether the gravity of the breach should 
be an element of the definition of material breach according to Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT 
de lege ferenda. Besides, since the Tribunal took the view that there had not been 
material breach of the Arbitration Agreement by Slovenia according to Art 60 (3)(b) 
VCLT,  there was no reason for it to examine the additional element of gravity of the 
breach. However, the notion of gravity should arguably be considered as part of the 
definition of material breach: in such a case, if the breach of a treaty provision which 
is essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty can be 
remedied, such a breach is perhaps not sufficiently serious so as to justify the 
termination of that treaty.  
 
 
5 Procedural Issues with Regard to the Purported Termination of the 
Arbitration Agreement 
 
Croatia’s position regarding the procedure of its purported termination was unclear. 
The Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of Croatia gave, by note verbale 
addressed to his Slovenian opposite number, the notification required by Art 65 (1) 
VCLT; nevertheless, in this notification it was stated that Croatia ‘proposes to 
terminate forthwith the Arbitration Agreement.’79 Therefore, in spite of the use of the 
word ‘propose’ Croatia essentially seemed to claim a right of unilateral termination 
of the Arbitration Agreement on the grounds of its alleged material breach by 
Slovenia. Nevertheless, Arts 60 and 65-8 and Annex VCLT do not provide for a 
right of unilateral termination of a treaty by a party on the grounds of its material 
                                                 
76 See indicatively Egon Schwelb, ‘Termination or Suspension of the Operation of  a Treaty as a 
Consequence of its Breach’ (1967) 7 Indian Journal of International Law 309, 315; Simma (n 73); 
Taslim O Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (Kluwer 1974), 114; Jan Klabbers, ‘Side-stepping 
Article 60: material breach of a treaty and responses thereto’ (1998) 7 Publications of the Finnish 
Branch of the International Law Association 20, 21; Bruno Simma and Christian J Tams, ‘1969 
Vienna Convention: Article 60’ in Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds), The Vienna Conventions on 
the Law of Treaties, A Commentary (2011) 1351, 1361; Thomas Giegerich ‘Article 60’ in Olivier 
Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, A Commentary 
(2012) 1021, 1032. 
77 See for instance in the Namibia judgment (n 41) [97] (‘gross violation of the mandate’); 
similarly Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, Namibia (ibid [80]). The ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros judgment (n 59) [73] used the term ‘fundamental breach’, thereby implying the 
seriousness of the breach.  
78 See for instance that in the Air Services Agreement award (1978) RIAA XVIII 417[18] the US 
used the terms ‘material’ or ‘serious’ breach as synonymous. This is often the case in state practice 
when there is a claim of material breach: states refer to it as ‘serious’ or ‘grave’. 
79 Note verbale (n 10).   
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breach. Art 60 (1) VCLT stipulates that the non-defaulting party is merely entitled to 
invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty. In order for the treaty to be 
terminated, the procedure of Arts 65-8 and Annex VCLT must be followed.   
In the same note verbale it was stated that ‘from the date of this note the Republic 
of Croatia ceases to apply the Arbitration Agreement.’80 Thus, while Croatia did not 
claim that the Arbitration Agreement had been terminated, but stated its intention to 
terminate it (presumably because there is no right of unilateral termination according 
to the VCLT), it claimed a right to cease to apply the Arbitration Agreement, which 
is another issue: it may refer to the performance of the Agreement and not 
necessarily to the issue whether the Agreement is in force.81 Croatia did not, 
however, clarify on which legal basis it could cease the application of the 
Agreement. In a subsequent press release, Croatia has claimed that, following its 
initiation of the procedure for the termination of the Agreement, the operation of the 
Agreement has been suspended.82 However, such a claim finds no basis in the 
VCLT: according to Arts 60 and 65-8 of the latter, the suspension of the operation of 
a treaty is brought about through the same procedure as the termination of a treaty. 
Slovenia pointed out the inconsistency in the Croatian position in that the latter 
was essentially claiming a right of unilateral termination which was contrary to the 
regulation of the VCLT, while at the same time it invoked the procedure of Arts 60 
and 65 VCLT.83  
The Tribunal, in examining Croatia’s position, used somewhat inconsistent 
terminology: on the one hand it referred to ‘purported termination’84 by Croatia, or 
that Croatia ‘proposed to terminate’85 the Agreement (and thus seemed to accept the 
Croatian argument that it was following the procedure of Arts 60 and 65 VCLT), and 
on the other hand it noted that Croatia was unilaterally terminating the Agreement,86 
without commenting on whether such ‘unilateral’ termination was in accordance 
with the VCLT. In any event, it did not answer the question whether Croatia had 
‘validly terminated’ the Agreement87 from a procedural point of view. However, as 
already noted, from the combination of Arts 60 and 65-8 and Annex VCLT it can be 
inferred that there can be no unilateral termination of a treaty on the grounds of its 
material breach according to the VCLT.   
It is also noteworthy that while the Tribunal had also considered that it had 
jurisdiction not only to decide whether Croatia had legally proposed to terminate the 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 For a distinction between the two notions see Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, Report of the ILC to the General Assembly on the 
work of its 53rd session, ILCYB 2001-II, 71 [2]-[3]. 
82 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia ‘Press release on Arbitral 
Tribunal’s decision’ 30 June 2016, available at < http://www.mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-
releases/,25852.html>, accessed 18 February 2019. 
83 Written Submission [3.16]. 
84 Award [160]. 
85 Ibid [163], [167]. 
86 Ibid [221]. 
87 Ibid [160], [162]. 
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Agreement, but also whether it had ‘validly ceased to apply it’,88 in the end it 
restricted itself to deciding that the Arbitration Agreement remained in force and it 




The Tribunal made interesting contributions to the issue of termination of a treaty, 
and more specifically of an arbitration agreement, on the grounds of its material 
breach. It confirmed that Art 60 VCLT applies to any treaty, including arbitration 
agreements, and it made clear that a purported termination of an arbitration 
agreement on the grounds of material breach by the other party does not deprive the 
tribunal of its jurisdiction, which is preserved by Art 65 (4) VCLT and prevails over 
the procedure of Arts 65-8 and Annex VCLT. Moreover, it offered significant 
clarifications of the notion of repudiation of a treaty according to Art 60 (3)(a), 
distinguishing it from Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT. With regard to the second version of the 
definition of material breach included in Art 60 (3)(b) (‘violation of a provision 
essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty’), the Tribunal 
consistently used the phrase ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty and accepted that a 
treaty can have more than one object and purpose. It also made clear that the gravity 
of the breach is not an element of the definition of material breach according to the 
letter of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT. 
Perhaps the most notable point of the Award with regard to the notion of material 
breach is that the Tribunal moved away from the formulation of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT, 
since instead of examining whether the breached provisions of the Agreement were 
essential for the accomplishment of its object and purpose, it required that the breach 
defeated the object and purpose of the Agreement. With regard to the latter criterion, 
the Tribunal in fact adopted a strict interpretation of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT, requiring 
impossibility of accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty as a result of 
its breach. Although such a strict interpretation offers more guarantees for treaty 
stability, questions arise with regard to whether it is in accordance with the letter of 
Art 60 (3)(b).  
In any event, the Award highlights the weaknesses of Art 60 (3)(b) VCLT. It is 
questionable whether the second version of the definition of material breach, namely 
‘the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose 
of the treaty’ is adequate. Although this condition offers guarantees for treaty 
stability, it could be argued that the breach of such a provision should lead to the 
termination of the treaty only if that breach is sufficiently serious. The possibility of 
accomplishing the object and purpose of the treaty through remedying the breach, 
which was pointed out by the Tribunal, is a consideration which should be taken into 
account in this regard, provided that such remedial action does not upset the balance 
                                                 
88 Ibid [167], [199]. 
89 Ibid [225]. 
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of interests of the parties to the treaty in the performance of the obligations arising 
therefrom. 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal did not clearly address other questions arising from 
Croatia’s purported termination of the Agreement, presumably because it considered 
that it was not necessary in order to decide the case before it, since it had decided 
there had not been a material breach of the Agreement. More specifically, firstly, it 
did not clarify whether a party is entitled to terminate a treaty on the grounds of its 
material breach by the other party, when the former has already irrevocably 
benefited from the treaty. Secondly, it did not take a clear position with regard to 
whether a purported unilateral termination of a treaty on the grounds of its material 
breach is in accordance with Arts 60, 65-8 and Annex VCLT and thirdly, it did not 
examine whether Croatia could cease to apply the Agreement following its 
notification of an intention to terminate that Agreement. According to the author of 
the present article, the first of these questions should rather be answered in the 
negative and the second clearly in the negative. With regard to Croatia’s claim that it 
could cease to apply the Agreement, it is true that Croatia had not clarified on which 
legal ground it based this claim. However, its subsequent argument in support of this 
claim (namely that following its initiation of the procedure for the termination of the 
Agreement the operation of the Agreement had been suspended) finds no basis in the 
VCLT. 
In any event, having accepted that the Arbitration Agreement is in force, on 29 
June 2017 the Tribunal went on to issue its Final Award on the case90 and gave the 
parties six months to implement it, a period which ended on 29th December 2017. 
Croatia has refused so far to implement the Final Award on the grounds that the 
Tribunal should have terminated the arbitration since Croatia had initiated the 
procedure to terminate the Arbitration Agreement on the grounds of its material 
breach.91   
Regardless of possible challenges in the implementation of the Final Award, it 
might be argued that the Tribunal in its Partial Award correctly decided to emphasise 
treaty stability as well as certainty in the conduct of arbitral proceedings, which 
would be prejudiced if a party to an arbitration agreement could bring about its 
termination on the grounds of an untenable invocation of material breach. 
                                                 
90 In the Matter of an Arbitration Under the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, signed on 4 November 2009 
(Croatia/Slovenia), Final Award of 29 June 2017, PCA, available at 
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2172, accessed 18 February 2019.  
91 Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia ‘Press release on Arbitral 
Tribunal’s decision’ 30 June 2016, available at < http://www.mvep.hr/en/info-servis/press-
releases/,25852.html>, accessed 18 February 2019. 
